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THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY 
AND HUMAN FREEDOM 
William L. Rowe 
According to the Westminster Confession, "God from all eternity did ... 
freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. Yet ... thereby nei-
ther is God the author of sin or is violence offered to the will of the creatures." 
It is hard to see how these two points can be consistently maintained. Hugh 
McCann, however, argues that by placing God's decisions outside of time, both 
propositions are perfectly consistent. I agree with McCann that God's deter-
mining decisions do not make him the author of our sins. But I think that 
God's determining decisions, whether temporal or outside of time, preclude 
our possessing the libertarian free will that McCann's believes we do possess. 
In fact, so I argue, if we possess libertarian free will, then elevating God's 
determining decisions outside of time only results in God's eternal decisions 
being within our power to determine. 
According to the Westminster Confession, "God from all eternity did ... 
freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass."l This remark-
able expression of God's total sovereignty over all that comes to pass might 
seem to make God the creator of the moral evil in the world. Moreover, it 
might also seem to preclude any free will on the part of his creatures. For if 
God has from all eternity unchangeably ordained whatsoever comes to 
pass, it is hard to see how it can ever be genuinely up to us what we shall 
do or even decide to do. These two rather disturbing results that may 
appear to follow from such an uncompromising affirmation of God's 
absolute sovereignty did not, of course, escape the notice of the framers of 
the Westminster Confession. For they hasten to add in the very next sen-
tence: "Yet ... thereby neither is God the author of sin or is violence offered 
to the will of the creatures." 
Recently, Hugh McCann has also endorsed a view of God's total sover-
eignty over all that comes to pass.2 He sees as a merit of this view that it sat-
isfies the principle of sufficient reason with respect to our free decisions. For 
although our reasons do not provide a full explanation of our free decisions, 
God's deciding that we shall so decide does provide a full explanation of 
our free decisions, and God has sufficient reasons for deciding that we shall 
so decide. In addition, McCann endeavors to show by careful analysis and 
argument that such an uncompromising affirmation of God's absolute sov-
ereignty has neither of the consequences that the Westminster Confession 
assures us it does not have: neither is God himself thereby morally evil or 
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the author of sin, nor does God's total sovereignty deprive his creatures of 
libertarian freedom. I propose to evaluate the success of his efforts to estab-
lish these two important claims. 
I shall be very brief concerning whether God must be morally evil, or the 
author of sin, if he decides that I shall make a sinful or morally evil decision. 
McCann is right: the answer is no. It does follow, I believe, that God is 
responsible for the existence of a morally evil decision, but the morally evil 
decision is mine, not God's, as McCann points out. Jonathan Edwards gave 
the very same response to the question of whether God is the author of sin.3 
I do want to discuss more fully McCann's views on whether God's exer-
cising total sovereignty over all our decisions has the merit of fully satisfy-
ing the principle of sufficient reason without endangering libertarian free-
dom. I'll begin by saying something about the issue as it arises in the 
Westminster Confession. 
If God has ordained from all eternity every decision I shall make, how 
can it sometimes be up to me what I shall decide? Jonathan Edwards was 
not deeply troubled by this problem because he did not believe that we pos-
sess libertarian freedom. But it is difficult to see how someone who believes 
in libertarian freedom can agree with the view of total divine sovereignty 
expressed in the Westminster Confession. Thomas Reid, for example, was a 
good Presbyterian who accepted libertarian freedom. I don't think he could 
have fully accepted the account of divine sovereignty presented in the 
Westminster Confession. For the idea there seems to be that before I even 
existed God had already decreed exactly what decisions I would make. But 
how then can it have been genuinely in my power to decide to do some-
thing other than what I did decide, or not to decide to do what God has 
already decreed I shall decide to do? If God already decreed what decisions 
I would make, then my decision was necessitated by his earlier decree and 
it cannot have been in my power to decide otherwise. Since Reid would 
think that some of my decisions are genuinely up to me, I doubt that he 
could have believed that before I existed God unchangeably decreed each 
and every decision I shall make. Does Reid then deny that God is sovereign 
over his creatures? Not in any really significant way. For the power we pos-
sess over our acts of will is quite limited. And our possession of this power 
is moment by moment at God's discretion. For this power is given to us by 
God and he may enlarge it, diminish it, or discontinue it as he sees fit. As 
Reid remarks: 
No power in the creature can be independent of the Creator. His hook 
is in its nose; he can give it line as far as he sees fit, and, when he 
pleases, can restrain it, or tum it whithersoever he will. Let this be 
always understood when we ascribe liberty to man, or to any created 
being.4 
Perhaps we can say that Reid holds a moderate sort of divine sovereignty. 
Not all of our decisions are fully determined or explained by God's deci-
sions, for he has given us power over some of our decisions. Extreme divine 
sovereignty holds that absolutely all of our decisions are fully determined 
by God's determining decision that we shall so decide. 
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McCann thinks there is a version of extreme divine sovereignty that is 
fully consistent with libertarian freedom. The chief difference between the 
version he advocates and that which I've attributed to the Westminster 
Confession concerns whether God's determining decrees or decisions occur 
at a time earlier than the decisions of ours that are determined by God's 
decisions. By taking God's creative act in deciding what our decisions shall 
be as itself not a temporal act, McCann believes he can postulate a full, 
determining account of each of our decisions without depriving us of the 
power to decide otherwise. And it is not difficult to see what he has in 
mind. If there is no divine decision that occurs temporally prior to our deci-
sions, then the problem we confronted with the Westminster Confession 
does not seem to arise. Of course, McCann is faced with the problem of 
explaining how there can be decisions that occur at no time whatever. He 
also has the problem of explaining how these timeless decisions can fully 
determine decisions that occur in time. Reid could make little sense of such 
ideas. But allowing that McCann's view of God's timeless decisions is 
coherent, the problem of how we can have control over decisions that God 
timelessly determines seems to vanish. But two problems, I believe, do 
emerge in its place: first, the problem of how God's total sovereignty can be 
maintained; second, the problem of whether McCann's view can ultimately 
satisfy the principle of sufficient reason. I'll begin with the first of these. 
It is necessarily true that I shall decide what God timelessly wills that I 
shall decide. But if at some time prior to my decision it isJlp to me what deci-
sion I shall make, then it must be up to me what God timelessly wills that I 
shall decide. If it is in my power to decide to vacation this winter in Colorado 
or New York, but not both, then it must be up to me whether God timelessly 
wills that I shall decide to vacation in Colorado or timelessly wills that I shall 
decide to vacation in New York. Once we insist that for every decision we 
make God timelessly wills that we shall so decide, I don't see how this con-
clusion can be avoided. But I suspect McCann would view our conclusion as 
compromising God's absolute sovereignty over my decisions. For instead of 
God's hook being in my nose, it now appears that my hook is in God's nose. 
God's absolute sovereignty is meant to preclude the creature's having power 
over what God wills. But, to repeat the point, once we insist on a logical con-
nection between what J decide and what God timelessly decides I shall 
decide, we can sustain genuine libertarian freedom over some of our deci-
sions only by placing what God timelessly decides within our power. So, if 
we want to insist that what God timelessly decides is not in our control, I 
don't think we can possibly say, as McCann does, both that we have libertar-
ian freedom with respect to some of our decisions and that for every decision 
we make God timelessly wills that we shall so decide. 
The second problem concerns the satisfaction of the principle of suffi-
cient reason. If I freely decide to vacation in Colorado this winter, as 
opposed to vacationing in New York, McCann says that my reasons for so 
deciding do not constitute a full explanation of my decision. But he thinks 
that God's decision that I shall so decide does provide a full explanation of 
my decision. For God will surely have sufficient reasons for deciding that I 
shall decide to vacation in Colorado. Thus we seem to be left with no 
embarrassing exception to the principle of sufficient reason. But is this really 
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so? After all, it was in my power to have decided to vacation this winter in 
New York. Suppose I had made that decision. Would there then have been 
a full explanation of it? McCann will say yes. For there would then have 
been God's timeless decision that I shall decide to vacation this winter in 
New York. And, of course, God would have had sufficient reasons for so 
deciding. But the question I want to ask is this: who determines which of 
these divine decisions is actual? As I've already indicated, given libertarian 
freedom it seems to me that I do. Look at it this way. There is the state of 
affairs consisting of God's timeless decision that I shall decide to vacation in 
Colorado, and there is the state of affairs consisting of God's timeless deci-
sion that I shall decide to vacation in New York. It is up to me which of 
these two states of affairs is actual. For which of them is actual depends on 
how I resolve my deliberations. And it is in my power to resolve them by 
deciding to vacation in Colorado, and also in my power to resolve them by 
deciding to vacation in New York. That being so, we can hardly explain 
why I concluded my deliberations by deciding as I did by appealing to the 
actuality of one of these states of affairs about God's timeless decisions. If 
anything, the explanation goes the other way. It is my resolving my deliber-
ations as I did that figures in the explanation of why the state of affairs con-
sisting in God's timeless decision that I shall decide to vacation in Colorado 
is actual, rather than the state of affairs consisting in God's timeless decision 
that I shall decide to vacation in New York. Thus, I'm very doubtful that 
McCann has succeeded in his efforts to satisfy the principle of sufficient rea-
son by providing a full explanation for our free decisions in terms of God's 
timeless decisions. 
In conclusion, it does seem to me that McCann has forcefully and inge-
niously argued for the perfect harmony of three ideas: (1) God's absolute 
control over every decision his creatures make, (2) the requirement of the 
principle of sufficient reason that there be a full explanation even for our 
free decisions, and (3) the requirement of libertarian freedom that it is some-
times genuinely in our power to have decided and acted otherwise. 
Moreover, it seems to me that he has made significant progress on the path 
to establishing that goal. But, for the reasons given, I very much doubt that 
it is a goal that can possibly be attained. 
Purdue University 
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